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Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the drivers of political cooperation in international climate change
policymaking. Specifically, we are interested in the stability and alteration of network features, policyrel-
evant belief structures and actor constellations over time as key drivers for cooperation in international
climate change politics. Although nation states undoubtedly continue to remain the main actors in inter-
national climate change policy-making, we argue that the international climate change policy field today
resembles a policy subsystem, a concept usually assigned to domestic policy arenas, involving a wide
range of different types of actors (state and non-state actors from various levels) who regularly seek to
influence policy choices around the climate change issue. To analyze and understand policy processes in
the international climate change policy subsystem, we apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF).
In doing so, we break new theoretical grounds as former applications of the ACF usually focus on do-
mestic policy processes in Western Europe and North America. In line with most recent applications of
the ACF outside this regional focus and with a particular emphasis on foreign policy issues, we further
extend the theoretical scope of the ACF and explore the framework’s potential to better understand the
policy process on a global policy issue such as climate change. In addition, to answer a common critique
of the ACF we also include structural characteristics of the subsystem as driving forces for cooperation
in our analysis. Empirically, we use political event data analysis to collect and systematize information
on the international climate change policy process in a long-term perspective. Event data describes in-
teraction patterns between various kinds of actors over time by encoding who did what to whom and
when. In addition, we code for all the actors their key policy preferences and understand them according
to the ACF as a function of underlying belief systems. Methodically, we apply a time dynamic network
model (Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model, TERGM) that allows for a systematic testing of
hypotheses on how and why network features, policy-relevant belief structures and actor constellations
have evolved over time.
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1 Introduction 
Global warming is a problem of global scale, and today there is a significant scientific and political 
consensus about its causes and threats. Often, these threats are not tangible, immediate or visible, and 
distributed asymmetrically across the globe (Giddens, 2011). In addition, the common-pool resource 
characteristic of the global climate and the high diversity of interests across nation states hamper an 
agreement on the right modus operandi to tackle the issue of a warming climate. Thus, to decide who 
should do what to mitigate climate change and to adapt to its consequences remains a challenging 
task even after 20 years of negotiations.  
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the emergence of successful international environmental 
regimes such as the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer. This triggered an academic 
literature about the formation, design and effectiveness of such regimes (Breitmeier et al., 2006; Miles 
et al., 2002; Mintzer & Leonard, 1994; Schröder, 2001). In the case of global climate change, political 
cooperation continued to be extremely difficult. Correspondingly, political science research focused 
on explaining cooperation hindrances with classical rational choice arguments such as the collective 
goods problem (Grundig, 2009; Grundig et al., 2001; Ward, 1996) or the dilemma between long-term 
goals and short-time interests (Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994). Recently, a growing literature on 
narrative country positions in the UN climate negotiations analyzes the relationship between the 
evolution of country groups and their respective positions on key issues and how this affects the 
outcomes of climate negotiations (Betzold et al., 2012; Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014; Brenton, 2013).  
However, a narrowly-focused perspective on global climate change politics that only looks at the 
United Nations (UN) negotiation process falls short of reality. Today, the global climate regime 
resembles a “regime complex” (Keohane & Victor, 2011) segmented into multiple levels of policy-
making and fragmented into a large number of institutions and arrangements. Thus, in line with the 
appearance of the multi-level governance (MLG) concept (for example Bache & Flinders, 2004; 
Cairney, 2012; Jörgens & Jänicke, 2004), manifold studies investigated global climate change politics 
from the perspective of collaboration of multiple actors (horizontal governance) across multiple levels 
(vertical governance) (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Betsill, 2008; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006; Bulkeley et al., 
2014; Gough & Shackley, 2001; Granberg & Elander, 2007; Lidskog & Elander, 2010; Nevell, 2002; 
Schroeder & Lovell, 2012). 
Despite this already broadened perspective on global climate change politics, little is yet 
understood about the political processes beyond the UN climate negotiation process. We argue that, 
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substantial cooperation in the global climate change domain mostly happens outside the scope of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), while the UN climate 
negotiations are in large parts symbolic action only. Therefore, in this study we focus on material 
cooperation between political actors that happens outside the UNFCCC and ask the following 
research question: What cooperation patterns can be observed in the global climate change policy 
domain, on what basis do they emerge, and what makes cooperative relationships endure? To answer 
this question we take in the perspective of the political process. This allows us to consider both actor-
specific and structural drivers of political cooperation in the global climate change policy domain.  
To analyze this relationship, we use the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier & Weible, 
2007) as theoretical background, which provides us with two concepts helping us to describe, analyze, 
and understand the drivers of political cooperation: policy subsystems and policy-specific beliefs. On 
the on hand, the policy subsystem concept serves us to define the unit of analysis. Although nation 
states undoubtedly continue to remain the main actors in global climate change policy-making, we 
argue that the global climate change policy domain resembles a policy subsystem that involves a 
wide range of different types of actors (state and non-state actors from various levels), who regularly 
seek to influence policy choices around the climate change issue. On the other hand, the ACF 
provides the concept of policy-related beliefs, which are presumed to be the “principal motivator” for 
or “causal driver” of political behavior (Weible et al., 2009, p. 122).  
However, the ACF does not offer theoretical considerations about structural factors that explain 
cooperation. In this regards, policy networks  (Adam & Kriesi, 2007; Knoke, 2011) are a useful 
theoretical and analytical tool. Firstly, they allow us to disentangle political processes in a combined 
perspective of networking structures among involved actors and actor-specific characteristics such as 
policy beliefs. Secondly, they enable us to “describe the patterns of interaction among actors working 
[in] a particular (…) decision-making process” (Henry, 2011, p. 361).   
Data-wise, we use political event data that systematizes information on the international climate 
change policy process between 2001 and 2014 to create a network of interactions between state and 
non-state actors. This enables us to analyze actor constellations in the form of networking structures. 
To test hypotheses on how policy-specific beliefs influence the formation, duration or dissolution of 
cooperative relationships, we collected data on policy-relevant beliefs and systematized them in the 
accordance with the ACF belief system. Methodically, we apply a temporal exponential random 
graph model (TERGM) (Hanneke et al., 2010). In a nutshell, these kinds of models enable us to 
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investigate the formation of cooperative relationships over time by including parameters reflecting 
how previous realizations of collaboration structures determine current cooperation patterns. 
In the next section, we briefly outline the key milestones of international climate change politics 
since 2001. Section three is devoted to the development of our theoretical argument, the formulation 
of hypothesis and the adaptation of the ACF beliefs system to the purposes of global policy domain. 
After describing data and methods in section four, the remainder of the paper covers the analysis, 
interpretation and discussion of our results in the light of the previously formulated research 
hypothesis.  
2 International Climate Change Politics 
Since the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, international climate change politics has been 
characterized by intense negotiations to find a global, legally-binding climate protection agreement. 
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, was the first legally-binding climate protection agreement 
aiming to limit the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) in a first commitment period from 2008 to 
2012. However, it was targeted to industrialized countries only, so-called Annex I countries, and was 
thus very limited in scope. Also, not all countries listed in Annex I effectively ratified the protocol and 
sanction mechanisms to control for compliance were rather weak. 
The international climate negotiation process reached its peak in 2007 (Blühdorn, 2012). At that 
time enthusiasm and public awareness were high, due to the release of the fourth IPCC assessment 
report (International Panel for Climate Change, IPCC, 2007),  the Stern Review on the economics of 
climate change (Stern, 2006), and the IPCC and Al Gore winning the peace nobel price. Spurred by 
this enthusiasm the international community agreed on the Bali roadmap for post-Kyoto negotiations 
paving the way for an international climate treaty superseding the Kyoto Protocol. In this context, 
great hope in “the battle against global warming” (Blühdorn, 2012, p. 11) was linked to the UN 
climate conference in Copenhagen (COP 15) in 2009. The conference was the final stage of two years 
of negotiations, but instead of producing a convincing strategy and binding targets, the conference 
revealed “insurmountable discrepancies of interests between negotiation partners” (Blühdorn, 2012, p. 
11). The Copenhagen summit ended with the Copenhagen Accord, a one-paged non-binding 
declaration on the intention to continue international climate policy efforts. Although the 
international community continued to negotiate in the following years, the discrepancies among the 
involved parties remained more or less unresolved. These issues included important topics such as 
setting targets for the maximum global temperature increase, finding the level of carbon 
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concentrations in the atmosphere, determining country targets, and agreeing on the responsibilities 
and capabilities of developed, emerging and developing countries. Finally, in 2012, the Kyoto parties 
agreed last-minute on launching a voluntary second commitment period from 2013 to 2020 (Doha 
Amendment). However, until today only 18 countries have ratified the amendment. Hence, it does 
not fill the gap left by the end of the first commitment period.  
The “Copenhagen disaster” (Blühdorn, 2012) seriously damaged the UN climate process, but 
vibrant political endeavors can be observed that go beyond the UNFCCC (Dimitrov, 2010). In 
example, in recent years an increasing number of countries have started to introduce national climate 
protection policies or are engaged in some kind of cooperation outside the UN negotiation process. In 
this context, we argue that global climate change policy is not only about the international 
negotiations that take place within the UN framework, but also driven by fragmented political 
processes manifested in political cooperation or dissent happening in the scope of multiple, bi- and 
multilateral arrangements, on regional or national level, as well as between different kinds of actors 
such as nation states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), scientific networks, transnational networks, private actors or supranational jurisdictions. In 
this regard, the global climate change domain can no longer be seen as the sheer result of UN focused 
international agreements that are implemented top-down on national level, but as a segmented policy 
domain (Biermann, 2006; Biermann et al., 2009) characterized by interlinkages between different 
parallel policies and regimes that are embedded in a multilayer and multi-actor governance system.  
3 Cooperation in the Global Climate Change Policy Domain 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a theoretical approach designed to describe, analyse, 
and understand political processes, the behaviour of actors therein, as well as the conditions for 
policy change. Here, the political process is characterized by the competition between different 
coalitions of political actors that advocate their beliefs about a specific policy problem (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007; Sabatier & Smith-Jenkins, 1999). These political processes take place within the topical 
and geographical boundaries of a policy subsystem, which comprise of both competing and allied 
political actors from a wide range of different types such as state actors, interest groups, NGOs, 
academics, or media (Henry et al., 2014).  
Important drivers of the political process are shared policy-specific beliefs on the basis of which 
they “develop enduring relationships” (Orr, 2006, p. 152) and the underlying structure of the 
respective policy subsystem. However, the ACF has been widely criticized for neglecting structural 
 Policy Networks and Belief Systems 
Cooperation in the Global Climate Change Policy Domain 
Page 6 University of Zurich, Institute for Political Sciences Zurich (IPZ), 18 June 2015 
considerations such as the logic of collective action mechanisms (Weible et al., 2011). An increasing 
number of ACF applications responded to this critique by including both shared beliefs and shared 
patterns of coordination into the analysis (e.g. Weible & Sabatier, 2005).  
In the international relations literature, structural drivers of cooperation are the focus of manifold 
studies. Cooperation is here defined as the adjustment of a political actor’s behavior to the “actual or 
anticipated preferences of others, through a processes of policy coordination (…)(Milner, 1992, p. 467).  
This implies that cooperation is not only driven by actor specific characteristics, but also by the 
anticipated cooperative (or non-cooperative) behavior of actor. In this regard, cooperation is a matter 
of rational choice and game theoretic considerations such as absolute or balanced gains, or structural 
considerations about the number of players, interdependencies between states, or the role of 
international regimes. In this context, Institutionalism, Transnationalism, or Regime Theory have 
developed hypotheses about cooperative behavior (Keohane & Nye, 1977). The core hypothesis of all 
these approaches states that a higher degree of institutionalization, interdependence, or transnational 
intertwining increases the likelihood of international peace and cooperation due to amplified trust 
and an improved mutual understanding of the motivation for specific behavior and preferences. This 
mitigates the perils of international anarchy (Schimmelfennig, 2013, pp. 89 - 137).  
For our analysis this implies two things: Firstly, we use policy networks as an analytical 
framework as they allow us to include both actor-specific and structural drivers of cooperation. 
Policy networks offer a useful “analytical toolbox” (Adam & Kriesi, 2007, p. 146) to analyze political 
processes. They allow describing and analyzing governance processes in the absence of a central 
steering authority. Thus, the analytical value of policy networks lies in the fact that they 
conceptualize “policy making as a process involving a diversity of actors who are mutually 
interdependent” (Adam & Kriesi, 2007, p. 146). Secondly, we take in a longitudinal perspective, as this 
enables us to study the formation of cooperative relationships over time as a function of anticipated 
behavior of other political actors involved in the policy network.  
The ACF and the Global Climate Change Domain 
Traditionally, the ACF is applied in the scope of domestic politics. Nonetheless, we argue that it is 
possible to stretch the framework beyond its traditional scope and use it to describe, analyze and 
understand political processes at global or international level. In doing so, we contribute to a growing 
body of literature that employs the framework outside of the geographical boundaries of North 
America and Western Europe. Only few of those applications emphasize global (Farquharson, 2003), 
or foreign policy issues (Hirschi & Widmer, 2010; Pierce, 2011). With respect to climate change 
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politics, there are two studies outside the domestic realm. However, they are not truly global or 
international, as they either investigate the policy process along “the domestic-foreign frontier” by 
including international aspects into the analysis of the domestic process (Litfin, 2000, p. 236) or 
investigate overlapping political processes at international, national and subnational levels. We 
continue and extend this previous work by analyzing cooperative patterns in the context of global 
climate change politics.  
One of the key arguments of this paper is that the global climate change policy domain resembles 
a policy subsystem, as it is defined by territorial boundaries (global) and comprises of a relatively 
stable set of participants. Earlier research underpins this argumentation. For example, Orr (2006) 
finds a stable participation of representatives from nation states and non-nation state actors that are 
both actively concerned with the climate change issue and bring expertise into the political process. 
Sewell (2005) comes to a similar conclusion, but argues from the perspective of international regimes:  
International diplomacy or decision-making often aims at negotiating some kind of explicit principles, 
norms and rules as basis for international agreements, treaties, or regimes. These international bodies 
and arrangements have functional and territorial components forming more or less autonomous 
communities with a particular domain of expertise and include a wide range of actors – including 
national delegations, IGOs, NGOs, and the media. Hence, decision-making at international level can 
be considered as similar to public policy formulation processes at national and subnational levels. 
Actor-specific Drivers of Cooperation  
Policy-relevant beliefs are the “principal motivator” for or “causal driver” (Weible et al., 2009, p. 
122) of political behavior, as they build the foundation on which policy choices are made. To be able 
to influence policy outcomes around a specific domain, participants of political process cooperate and 
identify allies on the basis of shared beliefs and form stable coalitions – so-called advocacy coalitions. 
Each participant holds an actor-specific belief system that consists of deep-core beliefs (fundamental 
and normative axioms), policy-core beliefs (fundamental policy positions concerning the basic 
strategies for achieving core values within the subsystem), and secondary aspects (instrumental 
decisions and information necessary to implement the policy core) (Sabatier & Smith-Jenkins, 1999). 
In particular, deep-core and policy-core beliefs are pre-existing beliefs that are difficult to alter, 
whereas secondary aspects are more instrumental and may change frequently. In the realm of public 
policy, it has been already convincingly shown that shared beliefs are a major driver for collaboration 
between actors (e.g. Ingold & Fischer, 2013 for a study on collaboration patterns in Swiss climate 
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mitigation policy). Correspondingly, we hypothesize that in the global climate policy domain shared 
beliefs are major driving forces for the formation of cooperative ties between political actors. Thus: 
H1: Participants in the global climate change policy domain more likely cooperate with those sharing the 
same policy-related beliefs than with others that advocate dissimilar beliefs. 
Moreover, since policy core beliefs are “very resistant to change, the line-up of allies and 
opponents within a subsystem will remain stable over time” (Sabatier & Smith-Jenkins, 1999, p. 123) 
and only change in presence of some kind of change promoting factors such as internal (e.g. policy 
failure) or external subsystem events (e.g. changes in socio-economic conditions, outputs from other 
subsystems or disaster), policy oriented learning or negotiated agreements. This implies that 
cooperative relationships once being established have a tendency to be stable over time in the absence 
of significant disturbances to the policy subsystem. Change promoting factors may result in an 
alteration of belief structures and thus affect coalitions and cooperation structures. Therefore, we put 
forward the following hypothesis:  
H2: Participants of the global climate change subsystem have a tendency to engage in enduring cooperation 
in particular when they share similar policy-specific beliefs. 
Structural Drives of Cooperation 
Reciprocity, transitivity, and structural balance are network effects describing patterns of 
interdependent social behavior between actors in any kind of network. Therefore, they are suitable to 
describe and analyze the formation and endurance of cooperative relationships. Reciprocity describes 
the degree to which an actor has mutual connections to other actors. According to network analysts 
any social relation shows a tendency for reciprocation (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Chapter 13). 
International relations literature, on the other hand, still disagrees about whether reciprocation 
increases cooperative behavior over time (Goldstein & Jon, 1997; Goldstein et al., 2001; Keohane, 
1986). Transitivity (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Chapter 6) reflects whether actors tend to cooperate 
with partners of partners. A positive tendency for transitivity in the global climate policy subsystem 
would imply that political actors tend to build cooperation clusters according the cooperative 
behavior of their cooperation partners. Structural equivalence is closely related to transitivity 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Chapter 9). It describes the tendency to form cooperative relationships 
with others making similar choices. This tendency has always been an important element of 
international relations theory explaining the non-desirable behavior of states to build equivalent blocs 
in particular in the cases of international crisis (Hirschi, 2011; Maoz et al., 2006). For global climate 
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change politics this would mean that rather homophile blocs of negotiation parties are confronting 
each other. This would run contrary to reaching a universal climate regime.  
4 Data & Methods 
It is the concept of subsystems where we can link the ACF to the idea of policy networks. While 
subsystem are defined by the policy domain (here climate change policy) and the geographic scope 
(here global climate change policy), policy networks are usually located within policy subsystems and 
comprise of the very same set of political actors that actively attempt to gain influence over policy 
outcomes (Henry, 2011). In network terms, these actors can be understood as nodes with the ties 
between them expressing the specific type of relationship such as collaboration, trust, resource 
exchange, etc. In consequence, each policy subsystem hosts as many policy networks as kinds of 
relations among its actor’s exist.  
For the purpose of our analysis, we used political event data analysis to gain information about 
the configuration of the global climate change policy subsystem. In general, event data can be used to 
collect and systematize data on political processes in a long-term perspective. It describes interactions 
patterns between political actors over time by encoding their participation in an event. In a nutshell, 
event data breaks down complex processes into a series of single events and so captures “who did 
what to whom when”. Thus, the event data set consists of the date of an event, the initiating political 
actors (the source), the targeted actor (the target), and the type of political action (event type) (Hirschi, 
2009). The basis for event data sets are text sources such as news reports or archival records. These 
text resources are coded in a systematic way “by converting natural language into nominal and 
ordinal data” (Hirschi, 2009, p. 91). Coding rules for identifying actors and events are formulated in 
encompassing codebooks (for events and actors) and dictionaries (Schrodt, 2011, 2012). Today, event 
data coding is done via machine coding. After an initial manual training phase of the coding software, 
massive amounts of text can be coded via within seconds. Machine coding does not only bring 
advantages over manual coding in terms of time efficiency, but assures inter- and intra-coder 
reliability, since coding rules are applied with complete consistency and are not subject to differences 
between individual coders, fatigue, deviant interpretations or biases concerning the text sources 
(Schrodt, 2011; Schrodt & Gerner, 1994, 2004). 
Strength and weaknesses of event data for empirical analysis have been comprehensively 
discussed in the literature {Gerner, 2002 #823}{Huxtable, 1986 #833}{King, 2003 #834}{Schrodt, 1994 
#815}. A most common limitation of event data is their dependence of the media coverage of an issue 
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creating a bias in favor of high-level interactions. While interactions between more prominent actors 
and less technical topics usually receive high media attention, interactions between less prominent 
actors and more technical topics, for instance during multilateral meeting or negotiations at expert 
level are less well covered.  
The POLCLIMATE Event Data Set 
We used the POLCLIMATE (Politics on Climate Change) event data set (for more info on and 
applications of the data set compare Hirschi, 2008, 2011) that identifies political events between 
international political actors based on news reports from Agence France Presse (AFP). As AFP has 
rather frequently reported on international political events on the climate change issue throughout 
the last decade, it provides a rich data source for monitoring and analyzing the international politics 
of climate change (Hirschi, 2011). For this study we updated the data set until 2014. The current 
version of the POLCLIMATE data set was coded and updated with the Penn State Event Data Project 
using the software TABARI (Text Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions, Schrodt, 2011) 
and covers mainly international events on the issue of global climate change for the period from 1 
January 2000 to 31 December 2014.  
Event types were coded according to the “Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO)” 
(Schrodt, 2012) system. To identify the type of an international political nominal codes are assigned to 
each coded political event (see table 8 in the Appendix). Following (Schrodt & Gerner, 2004) we 
aggregated political events into five event categories: verbal cooperation, material cooperation, verbal 
conflict, material conflict, and mediation and negotiation (compare table 1).  
Table 1: Event Category Aggregations for Climate Politics  
 
Category CAMEO Events 
Verbal Cooperaton (vercp) Cue Categories  010 &  020, 022, 040 -044 
Material Cooperation (matcp) Cue categories 03, 05, 06, 07, 08 &  21,23,211-214,231-234 
Verbal Conflict (vercf) Cue categories 09, 10, 11 
Material Conflict (matcf) Cue categories 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 
Mediation and Negotiation (meneg) 025 -  028, 035 -  039,  045 – 046, 105-108 
Based on Schrodt and Gerner (2004: 315) and Hirschi (2008) with categories adjusted by the authors. 
As event data describes interaction patterns between political actors over time, the dyadic event 
data can be aggregated into network panel data generated by transforming it into a one-mode actor-
actor matrix. Every coded event can be understood as a tie - a cooperative or conflictive relation – 
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between a pair of political actors (nodes). As the event data set distinguishes between sources and 
targets the resulting political network is directed.  
Before transforming the relatively continuous stream of political events (Hirschi, 2011) into panel 
network data, we distinguished meaningful phases describing particular stages in the development of 
global climate politics between 2001 and 2014 (compare table 2 for an overview on the phases). This 
allows us to observe gradual changes of the political network. We aggregated the POLCLIMATE data 
set into three subsequent phases (network stages), each of which capturing a time period of about 4 to 
5 years. We delimitated each period according to important institutional and political developments 
of global climate change politics.  
Table 2: Overview table Network Stages 2001 - 2014 
Stage Milestone 1 Milestone 2 Start End 
t1 Marrakesh Accords, 3rd IPCC 
report;  




t2 UNFCCC COP 11/ CMP 1 
Montreal, first meeting of the KP 
parties 
UNFCCC COP 15 




t3 UNFCCC COP 16 
Cancun Agreements 
UNFCCC COP 20 
Lima 
01.01.2010 31.01.2014 
The first network stage (t1) spans form 2001 to early 2005. It is characterized by negotiations 
concerning the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and starts with the release of the IPCC’s Third 
Assessment Report, the adoption of the Marrakesh Accords in 2001 and the US pullout from the 
Kyoto Protocol. The Marrakesh accords set the rules for implementing the Kyoto Protocol and details 
the flexibility mechanisms (Betzold et al., 2012). The phase ends with the entering into force of the 
Kyoto Protocol on 16 February 2005. This first period is “strongly shaped by disagreements between 
highly advanced economies on the one side (in particular the EU) and emerging economies such as 
India and China on the other side, but also between the US and the EU, on the definition of the 
climate crisis and appropriate measures to address it” (Hirschi, 2011, p. 12). The predominant key 
principle are the North-South divide and the principle of “Common – but Differentiated 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR/RC)” that distinguishes between Annex I 
countries (with greater historical responsibility and capability to combat climate change) and non-
Annex I countries with relatively less (or no) such responsibility or capability to combat climate 
change (Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014). 
The second stage (t2) spans from March 2005 until the end of 2009. The most important issues 
during this time were to implement the Kyoto Protocol and to negotiate its successor. With respect to 
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the institutional framework conditions three important milestones must be named: the adoption of 
the Bali Road Map in 2007, which paved the way for a post- 2012 agreement; the release of the IPCC’s 
Forth Assessment Report in 2007, which brought the climate change issue on top of the international 
agenda; and great enthusiasm among the Parties ahead of COP 15 in Copenhagen with respect to 
agreeing on a new international legally-binding agreement and a second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, the high expectations were not met. The Copenhagen Accord drafted at 
COP 15 was not taken note by the COP, but countries only submitted non-binding emission reduction 
pledges or mitigation action pledges at a later point of time. In general, the phase starts off with high 
political and public attention towards the climate change issue as a result of the release of the fourth 
IPCC report and former US Vice-President and environmentalist Al Gore winning the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 2007 (Hirschi, 2011). It ends with disappointment and resignation about the “Copenhagen 
disaster” (Blühdorn, 2012, p. 8). Similar to the previous phase there is a static North-South divide 
between countries positions, with developing countries and emerging economies seeing themselves 
as having little (or no) responsibility as well as capability to combat climate change. 
Stage 3 (t3) spans from 2010 to the most recent developments in 2014. It starts with the adoption of 
the Cancun Agreements, which advanced important mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund, 
the Technology Mechanism and the Cancun Adaptation Framework. Despite the failure of the 
Copenhagen conference in 2009, countries continued negotiating with the goal to achieve a legally-
binding international treaty that is applicable to all Parties and comes into effect from 2020. 
Negotiations on the design of the agreement mainly take place under the Ad hoc working Group on 
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). Its main goals is to reach progress towards 
implementing clear mitigation contributions by all Parties and assisting Parties to adapt to a changing 
climate (Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014). The time after COP 15 brought a proliferation of institutions and 
arrangements under the umbrella of the UNFCCC. Moreover, it also brought a call for 
reinterpretation and questioning of the UNFCCC key principles, as well as a rearrangement of 
country groups (Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014; Brenton, 2013). The divide is now between three main 
antagonistic camps. The emerging powers stick to the key principle of CBDR/RC and the North-South 
divide. They demand that industrialized countries must carry the heavier burden, as they are 
historically responsible and relatively more capable in combatting climate change. Alongside with a 
broad range of vulnerable (least) developing countries the EU presses for sharp emission reduction 
and calls for joint action of all involved countries. In this perspective, all Parties, but in particular 
industrialized and emerging economies must take action. Finally, the USA and other developed 
nations such as Russia and Canada are more reluctant in terms of legally-binding emission reductions. 
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In sum, the period after COP 15 led to the emergence of a new political landscape with a 
rearrangement of political actors and their positions as well as a “trend of increasing complexity and 
fragmentation”(Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014, p. 11) of institutions and actors groups. 
The Adjusted Belief System 
To operationalize ACF belief system concept for a global policy domain, some theoretical 
adaptations have to be done. So far there is only little research in this area. Only Sewell (2005) 
followed a promising approach and adapted the beliefs system for the purposes of international 
climate change politics. However, his version of an international belief system as well includes 
aspects of domestic policy processes, as he focuses on when, how and why national and international 
policy subsystems overlap. We took Swell`s study as well as other studies employing the ACF 
outside its traditional scope as starting point for the adjustment of the belief system. On this basis, we 
reformulated the belief system in accordance with the specific requirement of a global policy domain. 
Next, we formulated climate change policy-specific beliefs by consulting the relevant literature in the 
field (Bernauer, 2013; Betzold et al., 2012; Blaxekjær & Nielsen, 2014; Brenton, 2013; Dröge, 2010; 
Giddens, 2011; Hallding et al., 2013; Sewell, 2005). In a next step, we further condensed the belief 
system to three key questions that continue to be virulent for the global climate change issue and 
cover the most important beliefs. Compare table 7 in the Appendix for the adjusted ACF belief system 
for the global climate change policy domain. 
1. Who is responsible and capable to tackle global climate change? 
2. Is climate change a real threat and if so, is it induced by human activity? 
3. How are the risks and impacts of climate change assessed? 
4. What are the most important policy objectives and with what kinds of instruments should 
they be assessed? 
In line with these questions, we identified four variables that, taken together, cover the most 
important policy core beliefs and secondary aspects: fundamental position towards the distribution of 
responsibilities and capabilities of countries (responsibility), fundamental position towards causes of 
climate change (causes), fundamental position on how climate change related risks are assessed 
(impacts), and position on the most important policy objectives and instruments (instruments). With 
respect to the operationalization of the variables, we developed an encompassing coding framework 
defining variable categories. To increase inter- and intra-coder reliability, we formulated explicit 
coding rules and provided text examples for each category (compare table 6 in the Appendix for the 
complete coding guideline). The guideline was developed in line with previous work on the issue (in 
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particular Sewell, 2005) and in the scope of a pilot coding phase. In the pilot coding phase, we coded a 
number of countries representing all important country groups - that is developed countries, 
emerging economies, developing countries, least developed countries and small island developing 
states (SIDS) – for all three network stages. As a result, the belief system data set contains three 
subsets – one for each network stage.  
As data source we used statements made by high-level country representatives and observer 
organizations (High-level segment statements by Heads and Governments and Observer 
Organizations) at selected UNFCCC Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (COPs). We selected 
those COPs that best reflected the overall characteristics of the respective period. Specifically, we 
coded COP 16 (Cancun Climate Change Conference) and COP 20 (Lima Climate Change Conference) 
for phase 3, COP 13 (Bali Climate Change Conference) for phase 2, and COP 9 (Milan Climate Change 
Conference) for phase 11. Whereas earlier statements are partially available in written form, in the 
majority of cases we relied on webcasts of the Joint High-Level Segments at the respective COPs.2 
Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model Using Bootstrap (BTERGM) 
The pivotal difference of network analysis to regression analysis lays in the consideration of 
network dependence structures. Thus, to test our hypotheses we set up an inferential network model 
that is designed to model network dependencies over time. For this purpose, we apply a temporal 
exponential random graph model (TERGM) (Hanneke et al., 2010). As the name indicates, this model 
type belongs to the family of exponential random graph models (ERGMS) (Lusher et al., 2013). The 
main purpose of the ERGM family is to model the process of network tie formation. The presence of a 
tie between two nodes can be explained by nodal attributes, dyadic attributes or structural network 
characteristics. Thus, the explicit aim is to incorporate possible dependencies between nodes. 
TERGMs are extensions of ERGMS for modelling inter-temporal dependencies between the same 
network, observed at different discrete points of time. This is realized by including parameters into 
the model reflecting the ways in which previous realizations of the network determine current 
features of the network (Leifeld et al., 2015a). Alike cross-sectional ERGMS, TERGMS allow for 
 
 
1 Data for COP 9 must still be collected. For the purpose of this analysis we assumed that beliefs do not change between phase 1 and  2. 
This assumption is acceptable, as phase 1 is dropped in the time dependent model.  
2 All written and audiovisual statements are available on the individual COP meeting websites hosted by the UNFCCC .  
 For COP 20:  http://unfccc.int/meetings/lima_dec_2014/meeting/8141.php.  
 For COP 16: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/meeting/6266.php.  
 For COP 13: http://unfccc.int/meetings/bali_dec_2007/meeting/6319.php.  
 For COP 9: http://unfccc.int/cop9/. 
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incorporating both exogenous covariates (nodal attributes) and endogenous dependencies (network 
structures).  
In this study, we estimate our model by using bootstrap methods with estimation via maximum 
pseudolikelihood. In doing so, we follow the recommendations of Leifeld et al. (2015a). They regard 
this approach as preferable to maximum likelihood estimation based on Markov dependence 
assumptions (MCMC MLE) as applied in separable temporal exponential random graph models 
(STERGM, Krivitsky & Handcock, 2014). The drawback of STERGMs is the strong assumption of 
conditional independence of tie formation or dissolution across time. In other words, whether ego 
cooperates with alter does not depend on their status of cooperation at previous times. In our case 
this is highly unrealistic. Using the bootstrapping approach allows us to model time dependencies by 
conditioning on previous realizations of the same network.   
5 Analysis and Discussion 
Exploratory Analysis 
Visualization of the global climate change policy network over time suggests that the subsystem 
got larger and denser in t2 as compared to t1 (compare figure 3 in the Appendix for the respective 
graphs). In 2007, the high awareness of the climate issue triggered cooperative relations and 
motivated more and more actors to actively take part in the political process. However, the high 
expectations towards the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009 were not met, considerably abating 
cooperative behavior. This development seems to be also reflected in the data, since in t3 density and 
size of the policy network declined again. These first findings are supported by measures of network 
cohesion and centralization (compare table 3). 





Average Degree Transitivity Reciprocity 
t1 0.31 0.23 6.04 0.29 0.55 
t2 0.37 0.20 8.89 0.32 0.63 
t3 0.22 0.18 5.53 0.24 0.47 
Density is the simplest measure of network cohesion. It can be interpreted as the probability of a 
tie existing between any pair of randomly chosen nodes. Densities were very low in all three stages. 
In t1 less than 8% of the possible cooperative ties were realized; in t2 and t3 the values even declined to 
6%. This suggests that most political actors have not developed or sustained cooperative relationships. 
 Policy Networks and Belief Systems 
Analysis and Discussion 
Page 16 University of Zurich, Institute for Political Sciences Zurich (IPZ), 18 June 2015 
Density cannot be compared between networks without problems, as it is dependent on the number 
of the nodes present in each stage of the network (Borgatti et al., 2013, pp. 150-155). A better concept 
to compare network cohesion across the stages it is average degree. In fact, the average degree rose 
from approximately six ties in t1 to about nine ties per node in t2. In t3 the average number of ties per 
node decreased to less than six nodes per tie again. The number of cooperative relationships 
augmented after 2005 not only due to the larger number of parties involved, but also due to an 
enlarged cooperation of already active actors.  
The results for transitivity and reciprocity both point to a rather non-hierarchically structured 
network. Transitivity measures the probability that adjacent nodes are connected. This is also referred 
to as network clustering. Reciprocity reflects the rate to which the receivers of cooperative ties also 
send them back. Increased values of transitivity and reciprocity in t2 indicate slightly intensified 
cooperation between 2005 and 2008. On an overall level, however, transitivity was rather low, as only 
about 30% of adjacent nodes were connected. This suggests low levels of network clustering. Ties 
were reciprocated by about 55 percent in t1, by about 63 percent in t2, and by about 47 percent in t3. 
Thus, there seems to be a considerable degree of horizontal connection within the global climate 
change policy subsystem. Similarly, relatively low levels of degree and betweenness centralization in 
all three network stages suggest that the global climate change policy network was non-hierarchically 
structured. 
The analysis on the level of political actor reveals that few actors were intensively engaged in 
cooperative action. All three time phases showed a strongly right-skewed degree distribution 
(compare figure 4 in the Appendix). Thus, only few actors had many cooperative ties, but many 
actors had few cooperative ties. This is also supported by the values of nodal centrality statistics such 
as degree, betweenness or eigenvector centrality (Borgatti et al., 2013). Degree centrality is a measure 
for the activity of an actor. Betweenness centrality expresses how intermediate an actor is in the 
network. It is based on the frequency with which a node falls between pairs of other nodes on their 
shortest geodesic paths. High betweenness centrality suggests that a node exhibits a high potential to 
control relationships between others. Eigenvector centrality measures the centrality of a node in 
relation to the centrality of his neighbors. Thus, ego gets stronger when he is connected to strong 
alters. Overall, in all network stages political actors have rather low values of degree and 
betweenness centrality. This is in line with above results: Although there were several actors with 
considerably higher centrality statistics than the rest of the network, there were no single high activity 
or influence hubs that have the power to control the network. In t1 climate change politics was mainly 
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an issue among a small number of industrialized countries, the EU and the UNO. However, in t2 the 
picture got more diversified. Now China ranged among the most active participants together with 
other major economies. In addition, actors from science and environmental movements played an 
increasingly important role. Finally, other emerging economies such as India and Brazil started to 
engage in material cooperation. In t3, the number of cooperative relationships decreased visibly, but 
the configuration of higher-degree actors remained more or less unchanged. Now a number of 
industrialized countries like the USA, Germany, Japan or Australia, the EU, major emerging 
economies, and science belong to the most actively cooperating actors. Similar to the other centrality 
statistics, eigenvector centrality values are high for the USA, EU, and the UNO in all phases. Thus, 
they are linked to almost all the other active actors. Again the composition of central actors changed 
in t2. For example, whereas Russia was actively engaged in cooperative relationships with high-level 
actors during t1, it lost centrality after 2005. Emerging economies like India, China and Brazil gained 
in importance between 2005 and 2008. In t3, the number of actors showing a high eigenvector 
centrality decreased again.  
TERGM With and Without Cross-Temporal Dependencies 
In the theoretical section, we assumed that at global level cooperation on the climate change issue 
is driven by characteristics of the involved actors and features of the policy subsystem. To test this 
relationship we set up two TERGMs, one without and one with temporal effects. Whereas the 
parameters of the TERGM can be interpreted as an average across the three network cross-section, the 
TERGM with temporal effects reflects cross-sectional dependencies over time. We included in our 
models different network effects such as reciprocity, transitivity, or structural balance, temporal 
effects, and actor characteristics. We estimated the models with the xergm package for R (Leifeld et al., 
2015b) 
We set up a number of exogenous and endogenous model parameters (with the corresponding 
model terms of the ergm package given in brackets) as starting point for both models: 
•  Edges: This baseline parameter expresses the balance between creating and deleting ties 
(edges). 
•  Reciprocity: Models whether there is a tendency to reciprocate ties (mutual). 
•  Popularity spread: This parameter models the patterns of popularity across the network. A 
positive parameter indicates that actors have dissimilar levels of popularity. A negative 
parameter indicates that most actors have a similar level of popularity and the network is not 
centralized on in-degree (gwidegree). 
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•  Activity spread: This parameter models the patterns of activity across the network. A positive 
parameter indicates that actors have dissimilar levels of activity. A negative parameter 
indicates that most actors have a similar level of activity and the network is not centralized on 
out-degree (gwodegree). 
•  Triangulation: This parameter captures the degree of closure or multiple clusters of triangles 
in the data. A positive parameter suggests a high degree of network closure. A negative 
parameter points to a low degree of network closure (gwdsp). 
•  Activity closure: This parameter models the tendency of actors to send ties to similar people. 
Implicitly, the parameter models structural equivalence, as sending ties to the same alters 
means that two egos share same background conditions or the same neighborhood (Koskinen 
& Daraganova, 2013). This is also a parameter capturing network closure, when combined 
with the triangulation parameter. A negative estimate in conjunction with positive 
triangulations points to a tendency in closing 2-paths (gwesp). 
•  Shared beliefs: The main independent variables (“Responsibility”, “Impact”, and 
“Instruments”) are stored in matrices that indicate whether two actors share a policy-specific 
belief. We dropped the “causes” variable from the models, as coding them revealed that there 
are no significant differences in the position of political actors in t2 and t3 (edgecov).  
•  Belief similarity: Captures the main dependent variables in one similarity matrix  
•  Finally, we included several covariates in our models that display characteristics of political 
actors: a dummy variable indicating whether a country has high absolute GHG emissions3, a 
categorical variable indicating the level of per capita emissions4 (nodefactor), and a variable 
that captures the similarity in the developing status of countries according to World Bank 
categories (nodematch). 
We started with the TERGM without cross-temporal dependencies. Iteratively, we included the 
covariates (model 1), the main independent variables (model 2), and structural parameters (model 3) 
in the model. Eventually, to improve the model fit, we excluded the reciprocity parameter in the final 
model (model 4). Table 4 presents an overview of all estimation results. We can see that countries 
 
 
3 Countries with high absolute GHG emissions (CO2, CH4, N20, F-gases) – threshold: 0.5 CO2eq Gt/year; Source: 
Joint Research Centre (2015): EDGAR – Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research. Available online. 
URL: http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=GHGts1990-2012. Accessed: 10.06.2015 
4 1= Countries with low per capita emissions (below CO2eq 5t/year); 2=Countries with medium per capita 
emissions (between CO2eq 5-10t/year); 3=Countries with high per capita emissions (above CO2eq 10t/year); 
Source:  World Bank Data. Available online. URL: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC. 
Accessed: 10.06.2015 
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with high levels of GHG emission are less likely to engage in material cooperation with others. The 
effect remains stable in all four models, but decreases when including structural effects. Countries 
with medium per capita emissions are also less likely to engage in cooperative events than countries 
with low per capita emissions. Finally, countries with the same developing status do not significantly 
cooperate more often with each other.   
Table 4: Estimation Results TERGM without Cross-Temporal Dependencies 
========================================================================================= 
                          Model 1         Model 2         Model 3          Model 4        
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Edges                      -2.73 *         -2.69 *          -1.33 *         -1.34 *       
                          [-3.19; -1.57]  [-3.19; -1.63]  [ -1.56; -0.58]  [-1.56; -0.56] 
Nodematch income            0.08            0.09             0.05            0.05         
                          [-0.72;  0.33]  [-0.66;  0.36]  [ -0.18;  0.31]  [-0.19;  0.31] 
Absolute GHG emissions     -0.28 *         -0.27 *          -0.14 *         -0.14 *       
                          [-0.83; -0.14]  [-0.92; -0.12]  [ -0.43; -0.04]  [-0.44; -0.04] 
Pc GHG emissions high      -0.11           -0.13            -0.06           -0.06         
                          [-0.33;  0.04]  [-0.42;  0.06]  [ -0.31;  0.00]  [-0.31;  0.00] 
Pc GHG emissions medium    -0.27 *         -0.26 *          -0.27 *         -0.27 *       
                          [-0.68; -0.13]  [-0.68; -0.13]  [ -0.32; -0.17]  [-0.32; -0.18] 
Responsibility                              0.07            -0.40           -0.40         
                                          [-0.26;  0.62]  [ -0.65;  0.35]  [-0.65;  0.35] 
Instruments                                 0.13            -0.20 *         -0.20 *       
                                          [-0.46;  0.27]  [ -0.40; -0.01]  [-0.40; -0.02] 
Impact                                     -0.35 *          -0.64 *         -0.64 *       
                                          [-0.49; -0.18]  [ -0.74; -0.43]  [-0.74; -0.40] 
Reciprocity                                                  0.22                         
                                                          [-13.26;  0.78]                 
Activity closure                                             0.54 *          0.54 *       
                                                          [  0.41;  0.57]  [ 0.40;  0.57] 
Triangulation                                               -0.17 *         -0.17 *       
                                                          [ -0.33; -0.15]  [-0.34; -0.15] 
Popularity spread                                           -2.60 *         -2.60 *       
                                                          [ -2.97; -2.36]  [-2.98; -2.36] 
Activity spread                                             -1.96 *         -1.96 *       
                                                          [ -2.28; -1.62]  [-2.28; -1.62] 
Belief similarity                                            0.32            0.32         
                                                          [ -0.00;  0.43]  [-0.00;  0.42] 
========================================================================================= 
* significant on the 0.95 level when 0 is outside the confidence interval 
With respect to our independent variables, no significant effect for the “responsibility” variable 
can be observed. A significant, negative relationship is present for the “impact” variable. Surprisingly, 
actors tend to cooperate less often with each other if they assess the impacts of climate change in a 
similar way.  The same accounts for the “instruments” variable. Actors tend to cooperate less often 
when supporting similar policy objectives and instruments. We also controlled for belief similarity by 
combining all independent variables in a similarity matrix. In line with the above results, the model 
shows no significant relationship between the likelihood of cooperation and belief similarity. Finally, 
the model includes several significant network effects. A positive activity closure parameter indicates 
the tendency of actors to cooperate with structural equivalent others, thus those how share similar 
background conditions and neighborhoods. In contrast, there is a negative triangulation parameter 
suggesting a rather low degree of network closure. Both the popularity spread and activity spread 
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parameters are high and significant. This implies low centralization and non-hierarchic structures in 
the network, which is in line with the results from the descriptive analysis.  
Figure 1 shows the goodness of fit of the final TERGM (model 4) without cross-sectional 
dependencies. Here, the distribution of edge-wise shared partners, dyad-wise shared partners, 
geodesic distance, in-degree, out-degree, and in-star and out-star of the simulated models are 
compared to the values of the empirical climate change policy network data. The boxplots are the 
result of 300 simulations of model 4. The black solid line represents the observed policy network. As 
the solid line goes through the median for all distributions, model 4 shows a very good fit. 
Figure 1: Goodness of Fit TERGM without Cross-temporal Dependencies 
 
The TERGM with temporal effects now allows us to control for cooperation choices at each 
previous time steps. This is accomplished by including parameters in the model that reflect the ways 
in which previous realizations of the network determine its current features (Leifeld et al., 2015a). In 
other words, we now treat the previous network stages as a covariate for the current network, thus t1 
for t2 and t2 for t3. This also means that t1 is dropped from the analysis and only used as covariate for t2, 
as there is no previous network stage to t1. We set up the model in a very similar way to the TERGM 
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without cross-sectional dependencies, but dropped belief similarity variable. We included two 
“memory terms”, which can be understood as a “class of intertemporal dependencies designed to 
capture temporal processes without capturing additional network structure” (Leifeld et al., 2015a, p. 
4). Firstly, we created a memory term that models dyadic stability. The parameter can be intuitively 
interpreted as a count for stable dyads: a positive parameter reflects a tendency to maintain dyads 
over time. Secondly, as we dropped the reciprocity parameter from the model, we included “single-
period delayed reciprocity” (Leifeld et al., 2015a, p. 16)  that captures whether cooperation decisions 
are reciprocated over time.  
Table 5: Estimation Results TERGM with Temporal Effects 
 
============================================================================================= 
                              Model 1         Model 2         Model 3          Model 4        
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Edges                          -2.12 *         -2.31 *          -1.18 *         -0.84 *       
                              [-2.38; -1.89]  [-2.66; -2.02]  [ -1.18; -0.92]  [-0.96; -0.54] 
Nodematch income               -0.02           -0.03             0.04            0.08         
                              [-0.71;  0.26]  [-0.84;  0.27]  [ -0.59;  0.46]  [-0.46;  0.42] 
Absolute GHG emissions         -0.72 *         -0.76 *          -0.50 *         -0.40         
                              [-1.13; -0.13]  [-1.17; -0.16]  [ -0.90; -0.02]  [-0.79;  0.04] 
Pc GHG emissions high          -0.16 *         -0.12 *           0.09            0.13         
                              [-0.36; -0.05]  [-0.33; -0.03]  [ -0.26;  0.12]  [-0.18;  0.13] 
Pc GHG emissions medium        -0.18 *         -0.14 *           0.08            0.16         
                              [-0.30; -0.13]  [-0.28; -0.11]  [ -0.20;  0.08]  [-0.04;  0.16] 
Responsibility                                  0.49 *           0.54 *          0.50 *       
                                              [ 0.23;  1.12]  [  0.43;  1.06]  [ 0.39;  1.01] 
Impact                                         -0.09            -0.26 *         -0.23 *       
                                              [-0.25;  0.03]  [ -0.32; -0.05]  [-0.23; -0.08] 
Instruments                                     0.18 *           0.16 *          0.15 *       
                                              [ 0.02;  0.18]  [  0.16;  0.22]  [ 0.15;  0.17] 
Reciprocity                                                     -0.22 *                       
                                                              [-11.63; -0.22]                 
Activity closure                                                 0.42 *          0.33 *       
                                                              [  0.23;  0.97]  [ 0.11;  0.98] 
Triangulation                                                   -0.20 *         -0.15 *       
                                                              [ -0.82; -0.14]  [-0.75; -0.10] 
Popularity spread                                               -2.43 *         -2.62 *       
                                                              [ -2.79; -1.76]  [-3.08; -1.75] 
Activity spread                                                 -2.13 *         -2.11 *       
                                                              [ -2.13; -1.68]  [-2.14; -1.48] 
Dyad stability                                                                   0.45 *       
                                                                               [ 0.40;  0.48] 
Delayed reciprocity                                                             -1.12 *       
                                                                               [-1.54; -0.33] 
============================================================================================= 
* 0 outside the confidence interval 
With respect to the estimation results (compare table 5), we can see that in a time dependent 
perspective none of the covariates has significant effects. With respect to the independent variables 
there are interesting differences to the model without cross-sectional dependencies. We can now 
observe a stable and significant effect for all belief variables. We see a positive relationship between 
sharing the same conviction about the distribution of responsibilities and capabilities among 
developed and developing states and the likelihood of forming cooperative ties. The same can be 
observed for the “instrument” variable. In contrast to the former models, actors now tend to 
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cooperate more often with each other if they have similar preferences about policy instruments and 
related policy objectives. The effect of the “impact” variable the relationship stays negative. Assessing 
the impacts of climate change in a similar way is related to a negative probability of building 
cooperative ties.  
Figure 2: Goodness of Fit for TERGM with temporal effects 
 
Like the TERGM without temporal effects the model shows a positive and significant activity 
closure parameter, which indicates that egos have a tendency to cooperate with structural equivalent, 
alters. There is also a negative triangulation parameter suggesting a rather low degree of network 
closure. Both the popularity spread and activity spread parameters are high and significant. This 
implies low centralization and non-hierarchic structures in the network.  The temporal effects are 
both significant. The positive dyad stability parameter indicates that ties are stable over time. 
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Moreover, the negative delayed reciprocity parameter suggests that actors do not reciprocate ties over 
time. 
Finally, the goodness of fit for the model with temporal fit is particularly good for the out-star and 
in-star distribution, and dyad-wise shared partners. A less good, but still acceptable fit can be seen for 
edge-wise shared partners, geodesic distance, and out-degree and in-degree distributions. In all, the 
model shows a good fit (compare figure 2).  
Discussion 
The first question we asked was about the cooperation patterns observed in the global climate 
change policy domain. In this regard, we conducted a descriptive analysis of all three network stages 
investigating overall and actor-specific network patterns. The analysis of the whole network led to 
three main conclusions: Firstly, the cooperation network is rather sparse showing low values of 
network cohesion. This suggests that material cooperation on the climate change issue continues to be 
rather unattractive. However, once material cooperation is provided, political actors tend to 
reciprocate these relationships. Secondly, cooperation intensifies between 2005 and 2007, when the 
international awareness for the climate problem reached its peak. This is indicated by rising values of 
average degree, transitivity, and reciprocity in t2 declining after the “Copenhagen disaster” (Blühdorn, 
2012) at the beginning of t3 to values even below those in t1. This can be interpreted as a decreased 
willingness to cooperate. Finally, comparably low levels of transitivity and centralization and a 
considerable degree of reciprocation suggest a rather non-hierarchical actor constellation. With 
respect to the actors involved, it can be stated that between 2001 and 2014 global climate change 
politics was dominated by a small circle of actors among them a number of vital industrial countries 
such as the USA, Germany, Japan, or Australia, emerging economies such as China, India, or Brazil, 
international organization such as the EU, or the UNO, as well as representatives from science and 
environmental movements. However, overall low levels of degree and betweenness centrality 
statistics allow us to conclude that cooperation on the climate change issue falls far short of its 
potential. 
Moreover, we asked about the drivers for the formation of cooperative relationships. Our analysis 
has shown that the effects differ pending on the whether or not we included cross-sectional effects 
into the model. For the model without cross-sectional dependencies over time hypothesis 1 has to be 
rejected. This implies that on average belief similarity does not increase the likelihood for forming 
cooperative relationships. On the contrary, the impact and instrument variable even showed a 
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negative relationship between the likelihood of cooperation. In other words, political actors with a 
similar conviction with respect to the assessment of climate change impacts and a similar position 
towards policy objectives and related policy instruments are less likely involve in cooperative 
relationships with each other. However, including temporal effects changes the picture. Now, we are 
able to partially accept hypothesis 1. Thus, in a dynamic perspective actors are more likely to 
cooperate with others that share beliefs about burden sharing, policy objectives and the use of 
instruments.  Only the impact variable keeps its negative relationship with the likelihood of forming 
cooperative ties in the dynamic perspective as well. One possible explanation for this is that material 
cooperation rather occurs between actors from different kinds or income levels. Put it differently, it 
makes sense that material cooperation will more often be offered by industrialized countries to those 
countries most affected by climate than vice versa. Additionally, it can be assumed (and seen in the 
data), that those countries most vulnerable to climate change assess the impacts of climate change in 
relation to other issues in a very similar way. Moreover, most of the developed countries are located 
in the global North and are therefore less prone to climate related risks. In this regard, the impact 
variable may be correlated with the vulnerability and income level of a country to climate change. 
Not so with the responsibility and instrument variable. Here, the preference of the political actors also 
depends on the level of their development, but the relationship is far less clear. Many more factors 
play a role here, for example the overall position towards environmental or climate policy. 
With respect to structural patterns, both models show very similar effects except for reciprocity.  
Disregarding temporal dependencies, in both models there is a tendency for structural equivalence, 
but no tendency for network clustering. On the one hand, this implies that actors tend to cooperate 
with those actors that make similar choices according to their cooperation partners. On the other 
hand, the climate change policy network is rather anarchically structured and not clustered. 
Moreover, the two models show deviant results for reciprocity. In the model with cross-sectional 
dependencies the reciprocity parameter is positive, but not significant. Thus, on average a slight 
tendency to reciprocate ties can be assumed. In a dynamic perspective, the parameter turns negative 
and significant. This is also supported by the significant and negative delayed reciprocity parameter. 
In this regards, material cooperation is not reciprocated over time, but is arranged according to the 
respective circumstances. Finally, the negative activity and popularity spread parameter indicate a 
horizontally and anarchically structured subsystem.  
Finally, we raised the question what makes cooperative relationships endure. Answering this 
question is not an easy task. Our time dependent model shows a positive and significant parameter 
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for dyad stability. In this regard, we can confirm hypothesis 2: Participants have tendency to keep up 
cooperative relationships over time. From our models we have learnt, that structural characteristics 
are important factors for cooperation over time. However, patterns do not significantly change 
whether we consider temporal dependencies between the network stages or not. On the other hand, 
shared policy-specific beliefs only can be considered as drivers for cooperative relationships in a 
temporal perspective. This indicates that enduring cooperation is driven rather by shared attitudes 
towards policy-specific questions, than structural factors. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In sum, the descriptive analysis of the global climate change policy network allows us to draw 
three major conclusions: Firstly, the motivation for cooperation among political actors reached its 
peak between 2005 and 2009 when the overall awareness for the climate problem was high. After the 
“Copenhagen disaster” in 2009 the willingness to cooperate decreased significantly. Secondly, climate 
change politics at the global level is an issue among a small circle of actors from various kinds among 
them a number of industrialized countries and emerging economies, international organization, 
environmental movements, and science. Finally, overall cooperation falls short of its potential. On the 
other hand, the inferential analysis has revealed that cooperation is driven by both structural factors 
and actor-specific characteristics. We were able to partly confirm hypothesis 1: In the long run, 
political actors are more likely to cooperate with those actors sharing the same set of beliefs. 
Moreover, hypothesis 2 is as well supported, as political actors seem to have a tendency to keep up 
cooperative relationships in particular with those sharing similar beliefs.  
However, cooperation on the climate change issue is facing serious structural problems:  Firstly, 
the tendency to not reciprocate cooperation over time indicates that cooperation falls short of its 
potential and is rather driven by opportunity structures than by stable interdependencies between 
political actors and relations based on trust and mutuality. In a similar direction points the 
anarchically and horizontally structured policy subsystem. Increased network clustering would 
contribute to decreased uncertainties and political risks of political cooperation originating from the 
perils of anarchy such as free-riding. This would increase the levels of collective action due to 
enhanced communication, the creation of common norms and the possibility to restrain opportunistic 
behavior. In addition, increased network closure would facility sanctions in the case of non-
compliance to norms, rules, and standards, increasing mutual trust relations. Finally, the positive 
tendency towards structural equivalence suggests that cooperative behavior is rather a matter of 
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structural positions in the subsystem. For climate policy this means that there is a tendency for 
homophile blocs opposing each other, which is in stark contrast to eventually agreeing on a universal 
climate protection agreement.  
The next steps of our analysis may include the following: Firstly, we will complete and expand the 
belief system data set, which allows us to include a great number of beliefs, as well as the belief set of 
phase 1. Secondly, we intend to do inferential analysis on different aspects of the climate change 
policy network including both conflictive and cooperative ties. This enables us, for example, to 
determine advocacy coalitions. Finally, we intend to refine the event data set and collect the data on 
the basis of full text instead of lead sentences. This may refine the analysis in the sense that now more 
actors and events are included which have been neglected beforehand. 
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7 Appendix 
Table 6: Coding Guideline Belief System 
 
Responsibility:  This category addresses the question of who is responsible and capable to tackle global climate change. 
Category Definition Example Coding Rules 
EQUAL Despite historic divergent 
responsibilities all countries are 
equally responsible to tackle climate 
change. Nevertheless, different 
country groups may have different 
capabilities. Each country has to 
commit to legally-binding and 
multilaterally coordinated 
contributions.  
“Looking to the future, Australia will work to secure an agreement in Paris that is strong, 
effective and ensures countries live up to their commitments. To deliver on its promise, the 
agreement must establish a common playing field, moving past the developed-developing 
country divide that puts a brake on real action” (Australia, High-level segment statement, 
COP 20, Lima). 
 
“Let us stop a blame game. Let us stop standing. Let each of us – the developed countries, 
the large emerging economies, and the most vulnerable countries alike – come out of our 
respective cocoons. We must compromise to save our future. All of us live in one village.” 
(Kenya, High-level segment statement, COP 16). 
 
“We need commitments from all countries - common but differentiated commitments, 
reflecting individual capabilities as they evolve over time. We need a response to the climate 
challenge which is ambitious and equitable at the same time” (Austria, High-level segment 
statement, COP 20). 
 
“I am sure that nobody will back-down from a solution that foresees balanced and shared 
commitments for all, and I say ALL, the countries. Our future agreement must also 
incorporate the low carbon development option for developing countries: a solution strongly 
supported and promoted by the industrialized world” (Italy, High-level segment statement, 
COP 16). 
Reference to … 
•  the necessity to overcome the 
CBDR/RC principle or the 
developed – developing divide, 
OR 
•  the need to stop blaming each 
other, but to collaborate, 
OR 
•  the urgency that all countries 
alike have to fulfill their 
commitments,  
AND 
•  changing or evolving 
responsibilities and capabilities 
of countries. 
EQUAL_FLEX Despite historic divergent 
responsibilities all countries are 
equally responsible to tackle climate 
change. However, only voluntary 
commitments should be made with 
differentiated targets and full 
flexibility for all countries according 
to national circumstances. 
“Of course we understand that nation circumstances must be taken into account (…). That is 
why Canada supports CBDR. Any long-term agreement should be flexible [and] allow for 
all countries to choose the policies that suit their political realities “ (Canada, High-level 
segment statement, COP 13, Bali) 
 
Reference to ... 
•  national differences and 
circumstances 
AND 
•  flexibility for ALL 
countries. 
MAJOR_EMITTERS Shared responsibility among all 
countries. However, major emitters – 
those that emitted most in the past 
and those that are responsible for 
future emissions – have to take the 
“While we recognize the need to respect the principles of the Convention concerning 
differentiation, we need to apply these principles according to today's economic and 
geopolitical realities” (EU, High-level segment statement, COP 20, Lima).  
 
“And this reduction in emissions can only be achieved if all countries, namely all main 
Reference to… 
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lead and are responsible to tackle 
climate change. Therefore, 
industrialized countries and large 
emerging economies have to commit 
to legally-binding and multilaterally 
coordinated contributions. Full-
flexibility and differentiated targets 
shall be granted to least developed 
countries.  
emitters, act. Climate change does not stop at national borders. Cross-border problems 
therefore require global solutions. National efforts are good, but internationally coordinated 
and binding measures are better” (Switzerland, High-level segment statement, COP 19, 
Warsaw). 
 
“(…) the countries with obligations under the Kyoto protocol cause 30% of global emissions. 
Even drastic reductions in these countries will not be enough. Therefore, the new agreement 
must include all major-emitters. (…) “ (Norway, High-level segment statement, COP 13, 
Bali) 
•  emerging economies as new 
major source of emissions, 
OR 
•  the need to take action by 
developed countries AND 
emerging economies 
AND 
•  the need for socio-economic 
development, poverty reduction 
in least developed countries, 
OR 
•  the flexibility for least developed 
countries. 
DEVELOPED Shared responsibility among all 
countries to mitigate climate change. 
However, industrialized countries, 
who have predominately caused 
global warming in the past, are the 
ones to take the lead in mitigating 
climate change and support 
developed countries in taking action. 
Therefore, industrialized countries 
have to commit to legally-binding 
and multilaterally coordinated 
contributions. Full-flexibility and 
differentiated targets shall be granted 
to all developing countries, as they 
still have to catch up in terms of 
socio-economic development. 
The new agreement “ (…) should be able to address the genuine requirements of the 
developing countries by providing them equitable carbon space to achieve sustainable 
development and eradicate poverty. (…) The beautiful balance of collective action – the 
principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities - should form the basis 
of continued action. Our ambition in the post-2020 period is directly linked with ambitious 
actions in the pre-2020 period by the developed countries; otherwise the poor people in 
developing countries will not get the carbon space to achieve sustainable development”.  (…) 
We firmly believe that the INDCs are to be ‘nationally determined’. We do not see any role 
for any ex-ante review in this process” (India, High-level segment statement, COP 20, Lima). 
 
“Differentiation between developed and developing countries is absolutely essential to 
ensure the global level of ambition required to keep temperature increase below an agreed 
threshold. (…) While enhanced ambition is expected from all Parties, we must ensure that 
previous commitments are safeguarded and that developed countries are taking the lead in 
the global effort against climate change, while allowing developing countries to gradually 
assume further obligations, in accordance with their development circumstances” (Brazil, 
High-level segment statement, COP 20, Lima). 
 
„For us, that Agreement must be legally binding, with flexibility for LDC’s and SIDS. (…) in 
the global fight against climate change, historical polluters must take the lead with economy 
wide emission reduction commitments, and that historical responsibility should provide the 
basis of their contributions” (Guyana, High-level segment statement, COP 20, Lima) 
 
“(…) reflecting the principle of CBD (…)” requires “measures to protect the world´s poorest 
and most vulnerable to the consequences of climate destruction. (…) The rich part of the 




•  the principle of equity and 
common but differentiated 
responsibility, 
•  importance of the divide 
between the developed and 
developing world 
AND  
•  the need for socio-economic 
development of developing 
countries,  
OR 
•  poverty reduction of developed 
countries,  
OR 
•  “carbon space”, the polluter 
pays principle, or the (historic 
responsibility of developed 
countries 
OR 
•  the flexibility for developing 
countries. 
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Causes: Is climate change a real threat and if so, is it induced by human activity? 
Category Definition Example Coding Rules 
NOT_WARMING The global climate is not warming. No example found Any form of denial of global warming 
 
UNCLEAR Current trends are unclear No example found Any form of doubt with respect to 
global warming 
 
NATURAL Global climate is warming due to 
natural events 
No example found Reference to … 
•  upward warming tend 
•  natural trend/ unclear 
 
Both issues have to be mentioned.  
 
HUMAN Global climate warming is 
anthropogenic above all due to 
historic and current emissions by 
industrialized countries 
“The World Meteorological Organization’s in its recent report states that the concentration of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere reached a record high in 2014 and continues on an upward 
trend. The WMO also reported that 2014 so far has been the hottest year on record. The 
IPCC’s latest finding reaffirms that the human-generated climate change is real” 
(Afghanistan, High-level segment statement, COP 20, Lima). 
 
“Japan takes the findings of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report very seriously” (Japan, High-
level segment statement, COP 20, Lima). 
 
“As the report of the IPCC has clearly shown the substantial increase of global temperature as 
a result of emissions of GHG is man-made” (Argentina, High-level segment statements, COP 
20, Lima) 
 
“As stressed by many speakers before me, the threats of global climate change are real. The 
time to act is now. The world does not need any more catastrophic events to validate climate 





Statements such as … 
•  upward warming trend due to 
human influence is real, 
OR 
•  climate change is scientifically 
acknowledged, 
OR 
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Impacts: How are the risks and impacts of climate change assessed and valued when compared to other critical areas such as economic development and poverty reduction? 
Category Definition Example Statement Coding Rules 
UNCLEAR Risks of climate change are unclear – 
positive impacts are possible 
No example found NA 
LOW Climate change bears risks and 
negative impacts, but other issues 
(economic development, 
competitiveness, etc. …)  are more 
important 
No example found NA 
MEDIUM Climate change bears substantial 
risks and negative impacts. However, 
the costs of responding are also high 
and other issues (economic 
development, competitiveness, 
etc. …) are at least equally important 
and should not be compromised by 
climate change mitigation or adaption 
action. 
“Climate change is a challenge for us all, with serious environmental, social and economic 
consequences. Individually and collectively we must deliberate carefully and determine the 
best course of action to reduce emissions. This action must deliver real cuts in emissions 
and not put countries at a competitive disadvantage. And it must work alongside 
countries’ plans for strong economic growth, jobs and development” (Australia, High-level 
segment statement, COP 20 Lima). 
 
“Bangladesh, though an LDC, has expressed its willingness to participate in mitigation if 
supported with finance and technology. Bangladesh needs huge amounts of energy to fuel its 
development process and at present we have large shortfalls in commercial energy. (…) We 
shall not compromise our efforts towards development, but we are committed to put our 
efforts for mitigation activities” (Bangladesh, High-level segment statement, COP 16, Cancun) 
 
“The royal Thai government has carefully planned measures to reduce” GHG emissions that 
to not affect the Thai economic development path (Thailand, High-level segment statement, 
COP 13) 
Reference to both 
•  the seriousness of climate  
change impacts 
AND 
•  the necessity to consider 
other factors such as socio-
economic development, 
competitiveness, as well. 
HIGH Climate change bears high risks and 
negative impacts, and the costs of 
impacts clearly outweigh the costs of 
responds. However there are other 
issues (economic development, 
competitiveness, etc. …) that are also 
important. 
“In addition to all these challenges Afghanistan is one of the ten countries in the world 
identified as most vulnerable to climate change. We are experiencing that the impacts of 
climate change in this land-locked, mountainous, and least developed country. The new 
government and the President himself have recently identified the impacts of climate change 
as a major additional hurdle in achieving our socio-economic objectives” (Afgahnistan, High-
level segment statement, COP 20, Lima).  
 
“Climate change is a global challenge with serious consequences for nations across the globe. 
The cost of inaction far outweighs those of taking concrete measures” (Iran, High-level 
segment statement, COP 20, Lima). 
 
“Vietnam belongs to the group of countries that are most affected by climate change, also 
affecting its socio-economic development”. (Vietnam, High-level segment statement, COP 13, 
Bali) 
Reference to … 
•  climate change as an 
additional and major 
burden for socio-economic 
development, 
OR 
•  the serious consequences of 
climate change, 
OR 
•  the high vulnerability of a 
country to climate change, 
OR 
•  cost of inaction are higher 
than of taking concrete 
measures. 
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VERY_HIGH Climate change has most significant 
risks and the costs of its impacts are 
well exceeding the costs responds. 
Climate change impacts are among 
the most important threat to socio-
economic development and safety.  
“For Africa, Climate change is indeed a challenge. (…) most African economies rely on 
climate-sensitive sectors highly exposed to climate variability, drought, flooding, which are 
disrupting agricultural production, endangering livelihoods and health, (…)” (African Union, 
High-level segment statement, COP 20, Lima) 
 
„The projected future impacts present catastrophic scenarios for Kenya, Africa and other 
vulnerable developing countries (Kenya, High-level segment statement, COP 20, Lima) 
 
“Climate change is the single greatest challenge facing my country” (Tuvalu, High-level 
segment statement, COP 20, Lima)  
Climate change impacts clearly range
among the most important threats 
indicated for example by superlative 
formulations, adjectives such as 
catastrophic, or an enumeration of 
negative impacts.  
 
 
Instruments: What are the most important policy objectives and with what kind of instruments should they be addressed? Respective category hast to clearly dominate over other categories 
in order to be coded. 
Category Definition Example Statements Coding Rules 
COMMITMENT Preference is given to the matter of 
reducing political uncertainty as 
caused by non-compliance to national 
commitments and free-riding. The 
possible policy instruments to 
address this matter are monitoring 
and reporting arrangements that 
control, legally-binding 
commitments, and enforcement 
mechanisms (such as sanctions) and 
flexibility mechanisms to lower the 
costs of implementation. 
“(..) we need clarity on the information required to ensure that Parties proposed contributions 
are transparent and understandable; we should also agree on a process on a process to 
consider and analyze those proposed commitments before Paris” (EU, High-level segment 
statement, COP 16, Cancun).  
 
A global legally-binding agreement “(…) will provide reasonable assurance that there will 
be reciprocity of actions among Parties and instill confidence in countries to implement 
their own” (Singapore, High-level segment statement, COP 16, Cancun). 
 
An agreement must “deliver action over time. One effective way to do that is to allow 
countries to cooperate in full-filling their obligations” (Norway, High-level segment 
statement, COP 20, Lima) 
 
The Paris protocol “has to satisfy the following criteria. It has to be legally-binding. Countries 
will only be willing to make commitments, if they can be sure that all other countries will 
stand by (…). We need a credible review mechanism for commitments and a robust 
transparency system” (Germany, High-level segment statement, COP 20 Lima) 
Priority must be given to at least one 
of the following issues: 
•  transparency mechanisms 
or monitoring and 
reporting arrangements, 
•  the legally-binding 
character of commitments 
that ensures the reciprocity 
of action among Parties, or 
•  flexibility mechanisms in 
the sense  that the 
implementation of 
commitments is ensured. 
ASYMMETRIES Preference is given to the matter of 
reducing asymmetries of interests 
and capabilities between developing 
and developed countries. Possible 
policy instruments to address this 
issue are technology or financial 
transfer mechanisms, capacity 
building and Loss & Damage 
arrangements.  
“It is equally evident that developing countries could do more if finance, technology support 
and capacity building is ensured” (India High-level segment statement, COP 20, Lima). 
 
“We need a neutral mechanism to determine the reasonable fair share of the huge global 
effort of each party, both to minimize the risk of dangerous climate change and enable 
adaptation to the global warming which has already been caused primarily by the Annex 1 
countries.” (Afghanistan, High-level segment statement, COP 20, Lima). 
 
“Climate financing is one of the key elements. Climate financing is not only about funding. 
It is also about balancing economic interests and responsibilities. And of creating trust 
Priority must be given to at least one 
of the following issues: 
•  developed countries that 
support developing 
countries through financial 
or technology transfer, or 
capacity building, 
•  compensation payments for 
climate change mitigation 
action and impacts through 
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between countries at all levels of development” (Norway, High-level segment statement, 
COP 16, Cancun).  
Loss and Damage or REDD, 
AND  
•  equity in terms of a fair 
share of efforts and benefits 
of mitigation or adaptation 
action. 
UNCERTAINTY Preference is given to reduce 
technical uncertainty such as the 
height of economic costs imposed by 
specific commitments. Possible policy 
instruments to address this issue are 
all kinds of flexibility mechanisms 
that ensure that climate change 
mitigation action is in accordance 
with economic development goals. 
“As for addressing another sensitive and essential issue, namely the surplus and carry-over of 
Kyoto units, the solution should take into consideration all aspects: acknowledge the 
compliance efforts of the parties in respecting the KP provisions, assure fairness for all 
Parties, and correctly assess the economic, financial and social consequences of reducing 
emissions and the respective Parties. For achieving mitigation objective in a cost-efficient 
manner, we believe that carbon market is an essential tool” (Romania, High-level segment 
statement, COP 16 Cancun). 
 
„Latvia was very concerned about its possible commitments and their impact upon economic 
growth” (Lativia, High-level segment statement, COP 20, Lima). 
Priority must be given to  
•  the concern about economic 
costs of climate change 
mitigation commitments 
and fairness in terms of the 
social-economic costs of 
reducing GHG emission 
AND/OR 
•  to the use of flexibility 
mechanisms-   
TECHNOLOGY Priority is given to technological or 
economic solutions to mitigate 
climate change. This may include 
mechanisms of technology transfer, 
carbon capture and storage, the 
increased use of renewables and 
increased energy efficiency of 
technologies, among others.  
“This process is a technology intensive one. We, therefore, need extensive global cooperation 
including practical measures and mechanisms for developing, transfer and dissemination 
of technology on concessional and preferential terms. (…) Therefore international 
cooperation for developing and transferring relevant technologies and associated know-how, 
to help achieving cleaner energy from fossil fuels is of paramount importance. Furthermore, 
transfer of technology and associated know-how is critical for sustainable agriculture to 
promote food security and to combat hunger and poverty across the globe” (Iran, High-level 
segment statement, COP 20 Lima. 
 
“Reduction targets have to be set in all countries so that new, climate –friendly technologies 
are put to use. We in Switzerland have the technological know-how in water protection, in 
buildings, energy use and air quality management. Wealthy countries have to support poorer 
countries” (Switzerland, High-level segment statement, COP 16, Cancun).  
Priority must be given to one of the 
following issues: 
•  technology transfer as a 
tool to ensure that 
developing countries are 
able to reduce their GHG 
emissions, 
•  renewables, green 
technology and increased 
environmental efficiency as  
the preferred tool to reduce 
GHG emissions, 
•  economic instruments such 
as taxes, 
•  the balance between 
climate change mitigation 
and economic development 
is an opportunity, 
•  the important role that the  
transfer to a green economy 
play for mitigating climate 
change. 
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Table 7: Adjusted ACF Belief System 
Level Beliefs adjusted to 
international politics 
Climate change specific beliefs Variable 
Policy Core  
 1. Orientation on basic value 
priorities 
Key beliefs concerning climate change politics such as the 
nature and scope of national policy responses and 
contributions 
Instruments 
 2. Identification of respective 
needs, responsibilities & 
capabilities of involved parties 
Key beliefs concerning the responsibilities and capabilities of 
developing and developed countries 
Responsibility 
 3. Overall seriousness of the 
problem 
Key belief concerning the seriousness of the impacts of climate 
change and its socio-economic costs 
Impacts 
 4. Basic causes of the problem Fundamental position on the perceived causes and trend of 
global climate change 
Causes 
 5. Fundamental position on the 
appropriate level of governance 
in tackling a certain problem 
(nation state-centered action vs. 
international arrangements) 
Fundamental position towards the coordination of national 
responses 
Responsibility 
 6. The role of the global market 
(multi- and transnational 
corporations, international 
business) in tackling 
international problem 
The role of the global market (multi- and transnational 
corporations, international business) in tackling global climate 
change 
NA 
 7. Priority accorded different 
policy instruments of 
international politics such as 
financial aid/ transfer, 
monitoring, voluntary or 
legally-binding commitments, 
market-bases instruments, etc.  
Fundamental position on the most important objectives and 
respective instruments 
Instruments 
 8. Ability of international 
community to solve the 
problem 
Fundamental position on whether the international community 
is able to combat climate change 
NA 
 9. Method of financing  Fundamental position on how and by whom climate change 
related measures must be funded 
NA 
 10. Participation of non-state 
actors 
Fundamental position on the role of non-state actors in tackling 
global climate change  
NA 
Secondary Aspects  
 1. Seriousness of specific aspects 
in specific locales 
 
Estimation of the need for action on specific issues 
 
NA 
 2. Importance of various causal 
linkages in different locales 
over time 
Importance of specific domestic factors and restrictions, or 
international affairs and connections to third parties 
NA 
 3. Decisions concerning specific 
instruments, technicalities, 
institutions and arrangements, 
and procedural rules 
 
Decisions concerning the pillars of global climate change policy 
that is mitigation, adaptation, finance and technology transfer, 
and loss and damage 
Instruments 
 4. Information regarding the 
performance of specific 
programs and institutions 
Information on the effect of different existing institutions and 
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Table 8: CAMEO Codelist 
 
01: MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT 
010: Make statement, not specified below 
011: Decline comment 
012: Make pessimistic comment 
013: Make optimistic comment 
014: Consider policy option 
015: Acknowledge or claim responsibility 
016: Deny responsibility 
017: Engage in symbolic act 
018: Make empathetic comment 
019: Express accord 
 
02: APPEAL 
020: Make an appeal or request, not specified below 
021: Appeal for material cooperation, not specified below 
0211: Appeal for economic cooperation 
0212: Appeal for military cooperation 
0213: Appeal for judicial cooperation 
0214: Appeal for intelligence 
022: Appeal for diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support) 
023: Appeal for aid, not specified below 
0231: Appeal for economic aid 
0232: Appeal for military aid 
0233: Appeal for humanitarian aid 
0234: Appeal for military protection or peacekeeping 
024: Appeal for political reform, not specified below 
0241: Appeal for change in leadership 
0242: Appeal for policy change 
0243: Appeal for rights 
0244: Appeal for change in institutions, regime 
025: Appeal to yield, not specified below 
0251: Appeal for easing of administrative sanctions 
0252: Appeal for easing of political dissent 
0253: Appeal for release of persons or property 
0254: Appeal for easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo 
0255: Appeal for target to allow international involvement (non-mediation) 
0256: Appeal for de-escalation of military engagement 
026: Appeal to others to meet or negotiate 
027: Appeal to others to settle dispute 
028: Appeal to engage in or accept mediation 
 
03: EXPRESS INTENT TO COOPERATE 
030: Express intent to cooperate, not specified below 
031: Express intent to engage in material cooperation, not specified below 
0311: Express intent to cooperate economically 
0312: Express intent to cooperate militarily 
0313: Express intent to cooperate on judicial matters 
0314: Express intent to cooperate on intelligence 
032: Express intent to engage in diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support) 
033: Express intent to provide material aid, not specified below 
0331: Express intent to provide economic aid 
0332: Express intent to provide military aid 
0333: Express intent to provide humanitarian aid 
0334: Express intent to provide military protection or peacekeeping 
034: Express intent to institute political reform, not specified below 
0341: Express intent to change leadership 
0342: Express intent to change policy 
0343: Express intent to provide rights 
0344: Express intent to change institutions, regime 
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035: Express intent to yield, not specified below 
0351: Express intent to ease administrative sanctions 
0352: Express intent to ease popular dissent 
0353: Express intent to release persons or property 
0354: Express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo 
0355: Express intent to allow international involvement (non-mediation) 
0356: Express intent to de-escalate military engagement 
036: Express intent to meet or negotiate 
037: Express intent to settle dispute 
038: Express intent to accept mediation 
039: Express intent to mediate 
 
04: CONSULT 
040: Consult, not specified below 
041: Discuss by telephone 
042: Make a visit 
043: Host a visit 
044: Meet at a "third" location 
045: Mediate 
046: Engage in negotiation 
 
05: ENGAGE IN DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION 
050: Engage in diplomatic cooperation, not specified below 
051: Praise or endorse 
052: Defend verbally 
053: Rally support on behalf of 
054: Grant diplomatic recognition 
055: Apologize 
056: Forgive 
057: Sign formal agreement 
 
06: ENGAGE IN MATERIAL COOPERATION 
060: Engage in material cooperation, not specified below 
061: Cooperate economically 
062: Cooperate militarily 
063: Engage in judicial cooperation 
064: Share intelligence or information 
 
07: PROVIDE AID 
070: Provide aid, not specified below 
071: Provide economic aid 
072: Provide military aid 
073: Provide humanitarian aid 
074: Provide military protection or peacekeeping 
075: Grant asylum 
 
08: YIELD 
080: Yield, not specified below 
081: Ease administrative sanctions, not specified below 
0811: Ease restrictions on political freedoms 
0812: Ease ban on political parties or politicians 
0813: Ease curfew 
0814: Ease state of emergency or martial law 
082: Ease political dissent 
083: Accede to requests or demands for political reform, not specified below 
0831: Accede to demands for change in leadership 
0832: Accede to demands for change in policy 
0833: Accede to demands for rights 
0834: Accede to demands for change in institutions, regime 
084: Return, release, not specified below 
0841: Return, release person(s) 
0842: Return, release property 
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085: Ease economic sanctions, boycott, embargo 
086: Allow international involvement, not specified below 
0861: Receive deployment of peacekeepers 
0862: Receive inspectors 
0863: Allow humanitarian access 
087: De-escalate military engagement 
0871: Declare truce, ceasefire 
0872: Ease military blockade 
0873: Demobilize armed forces 
0874: Retreat or surrender militarily 
 
09: INVESTIGATE 
090: Investigate, not specified below 
091: Investigate crime, corruption 
092: Investigate human rights abuses 
093: Investigate military action 
094: Investigate war crimes 
 
10: DEMAND 
100: Demand, not specified below 
101: Demand material cooperation, not specified below 
1011: Demand economic cooperation 
1012: Demand military cooperation 
1013: Demand judicial cooperation 
1014: Demand intelligence cooperation 
102: Demand diplomatic cooperation (such as policy support) 
103: Demand material aid, not specified below 
1031: Demand economic aid 
1032: Demand military aid 
1033: Demand humanitarian aid 
1034: Demand military protection or peacekeeping 
104: Demand political reform, not specified below 
1041: Demand change in leadership 
1042: Demand policy change 
1043: Demand rights 
1044: Demand change in institutions, regime 
105: Demand that target yields, not specified below 
1051: Demand easing of administrative sanctions 
1052: Demand easing of political dissent 
1053: Demand release of persons or property 
1054: Demand easing of economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo 
1055: Demand that target allows international involvement (non-mediation) 
1056: Demand de-escalation of military engagement 
106: Demand meeting, negotiation 
107: Demand settling of dispute 
108: Demand mediation 
 
11: DISAPPROVE 
110: Disapprove, not specified below 
111: Criticize or denounce 
112: Accuse, not specified below 
1121: Accuse of crime, corruption 
1122: Accuse of human rights abuses 
1123: Accuse of aggression 
1124: Accuse of war crimes 
1125: Accuse of espionage, treason 
113: Rally opposition against 
114: Complain officially 
115: Bring lawsuit against 
116: Find guilty or liable (legally) 
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12: REJECT 
120: Reject, not specified below 
121: Reject material cooperation 
1211: Reject economic cooperation 
1212: Reject military cooperation 
122: Reject request or demand for material aid, not specified below 
1221: Reject request for economic aid 
1222: Reject request for military aid 
1223: Reject request for humanitarian aid 
1224: Reject request for military protection or peacekeeping 
123: Reject request or demand for political reform, not specified below 
1231: Reject request for change in leadership 
1232: Reject request for policy change 
1233: Reject request for rights 
1234: Reject request for change in institutions, regime 
124: Refuse to yield, not specified below 
1241: Refuse to ease administrative sanctions 
1242: Refuse to ease popular dissent 
1243: Refuse to release persons or property 
1244: Refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott, or embargo 
1245: Refuse to allow international involvement (non mediation) 
1246: Refuse to de-escalate military engagement 
125: Reject proposal to meet, discuss, or negotiate 
126: Reject mediation 
127: Reject plan, agreement to settle dispute 




130: Threaten, not specified below 
131: Threaten non-force, not specified below 
1311: Threaten to reduce or stop aid 
1312: Threaten with sanctions, boycott, embargo 
1313: Threaten to reduce or break relations 
132: Threaten with administrative sanctions, not specified below 
1321: Threaten with restrictions on political freedoms 
1322: Threaten to ban political parties or politicians 
1323: Threaten to impose curfew 
1324: Threaten to impose state of emergency or martial law 
133: Threaten with political dissent, protest 
134: Threaten to halt negotiations 
135: Threaten to halt mediation 
136: Threaten to halt international involvement (non-mediation) 
137: Threaten with repression 
138: Threaten with military force, not specified below 
1381: Threaten blockade 
1382: Threaten occupation 
1383: Threaten unconventional violence 
1384: Threaten conventional attack 
1385: Threaten attack with WMD 
139: Give ultimatum 
 
14: PROTEST 
140: Engage in political dissent, not specified below 
141: Demonstrate or rally, not specified below 
1411: Demonstrate for leadership change 
1412: Demonstrate for policy change 
1413: Demonstrate for rights 
1414: Demonstrate for change in institutions, regime 
142: Conduct hunger strike, not specified below 
1421: Conduct hunger strike for leadership change 
1422: Conduct hunger strike for policy change 
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1423: Conduct hunger strike for rights 
1424: Conduct hunger strike for change in institutions, regime 
143: Conduct strike or boycott, not specified below 
1431: Conduct strike or boycott for leadership change 
1432: Conduct strike or boycott for policy change 
1433: Conduct strike or boycott for rights 
1434: Conduct strike or boycott for change in institutions, regime 
144: Obstruct passage, block, not specified below 
1441: Obstruct passage to demand leadership change 
1442: Obstruct passage to demand policy change 
1443: Obstruct passage to demand rights 
1444: Obstruct passage to demand change in institutions, regime 
145: Protest violently, riot, not specified below 
1451: Engage in violent protest for leadership change 
1452: Engage in violent protest for policy change 
1453: Engage in violent protest for rights 
1454: Engage in violent protest for change in institutions, regime 
 
15: EXHIBIT FORCE POSTURE 
150: Demonstrate military or police power, not specified below 
151: Increase police alert status 
152: Increase military alert status 
153: Mobilize or increase police power 
154: Mobilize or increase armed forces 
155: Mobilize or increase cyber-forces 
 
16: REDUCE RELATIONS 
160: Reduce relations, not specified below 
161: Reduce or break diplomatic relations 
162: Reduce or stop material aid, not specified below 
1621: Reduce or stop economic assistance 
1622: Reduce or stop military assistance 
1623: Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance 
163: Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions 
164: Halt negotiations 
165: Halt mediation 
166: Expel or withdraw, not specified below 
1661: Expel or withdraw peacekeepers 
1662: Expel or withdraw inspectors, observers 
1663: Expel or withdraw aid agencies 
 
17: COERCE 
170: Coerce, not specified below 
171: Seize or damage property, not specified below 
1711: Confiscate property 
1712: Destroy property 
172: Impose administrative sanctions, not specified below 
1721: Impose restrictions on political freedoms 
1722: Ban political parties or politicians 
1723: Impose curfew 
1724: Impose state of emergency or martial law 
173: Arrest, detain, or charge with legal action 
174: Expel or deport individuals 
175: Use tactics of violent repression 
176: Attack cybernetically 
 
18: ASSAULT 
180: Use unconventional violence, not specified below 
181: Abduct, hijack, or take hostage 
182: Physically assault, not specified below 
1821: Sexually assault 
1822: Torture 
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1823: Kill by physical assault 
183: Conduct suicide, car, or other non-military bombing, not specified below 
1831: Carry out suicide bombing 
1832: Carry out vehicular bombing 
1833: Carry out roadside bombing 
1834: Carry out location bombing 
184: Use as human shield 





190: Use conventional military force, not specified below 
191: Impose blockade, restrict movement 
192: Occupy territory 
193: Fight with small arms and light weapons 
194: Fight with artillery and tanks 
195: Employ aerial weapons, not specified below 
1951: Employ precision-guided aerial munitions 
1952: Employ remotely piloted aerial munitions 
196: Violate ceasefire 
 
20: USE UNCONVENTIONAL MASS VIOLENCE 
200: Use unconventional mass violence, not specified below 
201: Engage in mass expulsion 
202: Engage in mass killings 
203: Engage in ethnic cleansing 
204: Use weapons of mass destruction, not specified below 
2041: Use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons 
2042: Detonate nuclear weapons   
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Figure 3: Climate Change Policy Subsystem between 2001 and 2014 
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Figure 4: Degree Distribution 
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